Iraqi Army Unable To Take Over

September 6, 2007
Iraqi Army Unable To Take Over

• U.S. and Iraqi alliances with Sunni tribal forces in Anbar province have produced "real and encouraging" military progress and intelligence cooperation, and there are promising signs they can be replicated elsewhere. Such relationships, however, "will have to be managed very carefully in order for them to contribute to Iraq's long-term security."


• The Defense Ministry is increasingly capable, though "capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization" that undermine the military's readiness and effectiveness.


• Iraqi special operations forces are the most capable and well-trained element of the Iraqi armed forces, but the border protection force is ineffective.


• The Iraqi army is short of "seasoned leadership" at all levels, with a particular shortage of noncommissioned officers. High levels of army absenteeism strain the system, though there is an "abundance of volunteers for service."


• Logistics remain the Iraqi army's "Achilles' heel," and adequate capability in this area is "at least 24 months away."


• Sectarian problems in local police forces -- as opposed to the national force -- are mitigated by their deployment within their own ethnic and religious areas, and the force itself is "showing promise."


• The Interior Ministry has "little control" over the 140,000 armed members of the Facilities Protection Service, which guards government buildings.